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NOTE 
Mental Illness in Prison &  
The Objective Unreasonableness of the Estelle Test 
Jack McAllister* 
INTRODUCTION 
The largest providers of psychiatric care are not hospitals.1 It is prisons and 
jails who are the largest providers of psychiatric care.2 Beginning with the 
widespread deinstitutionalization of state-run psychiatric hospitals in the late 
1950s, prisons and jails have become the nation’s new mental healthcare system.3 
And this trend shows no sign of changing; for even though the total prison 
population has decreased in recent years, the proportion of that population 
experiencing mental illnesses has increased.4  
The Eighth Amendment requires correctional facilities to provide inmates 
with adequate healthcare, but shockingly few inmates actually receive it.5 Perhaps 
this is because correctional facilities are rarely held liable under the Eighth 
Amendment for failing to provide adequate healthcare.6 Indeed, the standard that 
courts use to measure whether correctional facilities have violated the Eighth 
Amendment is immoderately pro-prison.7 This Eighth Amendment standard, known 
as the Estelle test,8 has two prongs. The first prong requires prisoners to prove they 
have an objectively serious medical need.9 The second prong requires prisoners to 
prove that the correctional facility10 failed to address the prisoner’s medical need 
with deliberate indifference.11 Deliberate indifference requires a “culpable state of 
mind”; to be held liable, a prison official must have subjectively intended to punish 
a prisoner by depriving him or her of medical care.12 A prison official who is merely 
 
*  Indiana University Maurer School of Law, J.D. 2020; Senior Managing Editor, Indiana Journal 
of Law & Social Equality, Volume 8. 
1  See Alisa Roth, A ‘Hellish World’: The Mental Health Crisis Overwhelming America’s Prisons, 
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/mar/31/mental-
health-care-crisis-overwhelming-prison-jail. 
2  Id. 
3  Id. 
4  Id. 
5  See infra notes 48–50. 
6  See infra notes 22–26, 51–54, and accompanying text. 
7  See infra Section I.  
8  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
9  Id. at 106. 
10  I will use the nouns “prison,” “jail,” and “correctional facility” interchangeably, as prisoners are 
housed in both prisons and jails. See infra notes 163–65. 
11  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 106; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1991) (holding that 
inhumane conditions, alone, are not enough to trigger constitutional scrutiny). 
12  Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297, 300–02. 
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negligent or who acts without the intent to punish will not be held liable.13 As other 
commentators have noted, the Estelle test has clothed prison officials in “practical 
immunity” from liability for constitutional violations.14 Because the second prong 
requires an inquiry into the prison official’s subjective state of mind, it places a 
particularly heavy burden on plaintiffs in Eighth Amendment litigation. 
In Kinglsey v. Hendrickson, the Supreme Court suggested it may be willing to 
re-evaluate the Estelle test.15 In Kingsley, the Court held that the second prong of 
the Estelle test—the deliberate indifference standard—should not be used to 
evaluate pre-trial detainee excessive-force claims because pre-trial detainee claims 
arise from the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.16 Instead of 
deliberate indifference, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely 
or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”17  
Although Kinglsey dealt with an excessive-force claim, some circuits have 
interpreted it broadly to apply to both medical care and excessive-force claims of 
pre-trial detainees.18 Other circuits, on the other hand, have interpreted Kinglsey 
more narrowly and apply it only to pre-trial detainee excessive force claims.19 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should resolve this circuit split and 
endorse a broad reading of Kinglsey. Not only should the Supreme Court affirm that 
Kinglsey applies equally to all pre-trial detainee claims, it should take the 
opportunity to extend Kinglsey’s holding to reach prisoner claims as well. It is high 
time for the Supreme Court to reexamine the theoretical underpinnings of Estelle, 
used to justify the deliberate indifference standard. For it is unclear why a 
prisoner’s right to adequate medical care should be grounded in the constitutional 
ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and not in due process. As emphasized 
below, Estelle’s reading of the word “punishment” is divorced from the Eighth 
Amendment’s text and original purpose.20 Not only does Estelle sit upon a 
precarious legal foundation, the burden it places on plaintiffs often allows a 
vulnerable population of inmates—those with mental illness—to be deprived of 
adequate healthcare. 
Part I of this Note provides an inmate’s account of the cruel, yet 
constitutional, treatment inmates with mental illness too often suffer in correctional 
facilities, and also includes a brief history of how prisons have become de facto 
 
13  See id. 
14  See David M. Shapiro & Charles Hogle, The Horror Chamber: Unqualified Impunity in Prison, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2021, 2023 (2018). 
15  135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015); see also infra Part III 
16  See 135 S. Ct. at 2473. 
17  Id. 
18  See, e.g., Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350–52 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding Kingsley 
applies to both excessive force and medical-care claims). 
19  See, e.g., Nam Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cty. Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 
2017) (holding that pre-trial detainees’ denial of medical care claims are evaluated under the 
same standard as prisoners’ claims). 
20  See infra Part IV. 
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mental hospitals. Part II explores the two prongs of the Estelle test and why the 
standard is particularly unfair for inmates who have mental illnesses. Part III 
discusses the 2015 Supreme Court case Kingsley v. Hendrickson and how that 
opinion has precipitated a circuit split over the merits of the traditional Estelle 
test’s application to pretrial detainee claims. Part IV presents an argument for why 
the law should not distinguish between pretrial detainees and prisoners and why a 
purely objective standard should apply in all inmate medical care cases. 
I. MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT INSIDE — AN INMATE’S EXPERIENCE  
John Rudd, an inmate in a West Virginia federal prison, was serving a 
sentence for possession of cocaine.21 Rudd had long history of serious mental illness, 
yet the prison placed him on “care level 1”—a label reserved for those with no 
significant mental health needs.22 In April 2017, Rudd’s mental health took a turn 
for the worse, and he became suicidal.23 He told prison officials that he wanted to 
hang himself.24 Their response? They moved him into a suicide-watch cell, where 
Rudd banged his head against the wall in an attempt to snap his own neck.25 To get 
him to calm down, prison staff had to inject him with haloperidol—a drug used to 
treat schizophrenia and help prevent suicide.26  
Following this incident, the prison neither sent Rudd to a psychiatric ward 
for treatment nor placed him on a higher care level. Officials simply moved him 
back into the prison’s general population.27 In fact, prison psychology staff 
ultimately determined that Rudd was likely faking his symptoms and marked 
Rudd’s Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Schizophrenia as “resolved.”28 So 
instead of receiving continued treatment and monitoring of his mental health, Rudd 
was left at the lowest care level and instructed to tell one of the guards if he ever 
felt suicidal again.29 
Despite the prison’s flippant response, if Rudd had filed a lawsuit against the 
prison for denial of medical care in light of this incident, the prison would almost 
assuredly be found not liable under the Estelle test. As mentioned above, flippancy 
or negligence in treating an inmate’s medical condition will not subject a prison to 
Eighth Amendment liability. A prison will be liable under the Eighth Amendment 
only if an inmate can prove that the prison denied him or her adequate medical care 
 
21  Christie Thompson & Taylor Elizabeth Eldridge, Treatment Denied: The Mental Health Crisis in 
Federal Prisons, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 21, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/11/21/treatment-denied-the-mental-health-crisis-in-
federal-prisons. 
22  Id.  
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
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as a way to punish him or her.30 And so even though Rudd suffered greatly under 
the prison’s care, he would probably be unable to prove that the prison staff caused 
his suffering to punish him.31 
Unfortunately, Rudd’s experience is far too common in prisons and jails 
across the country.32 A 2006 study by Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 56% of 
state prisoners, 45% of federal prisoners, and 64% of jail inmates had either current 
symptoms or a recent history of mental illness,33 representing a substantial 
increase when compared to the Bureau of Prison Statistics 1999 study.34 The 
incarceration of people with mental illness has become so prevalent that our 
nation’s prisons and jails have been dubbed the “de facto mental healthcare 
providers.”35 Because of the overwhelming population of prisoners with mental 
illness and pro-prison legal doctrine, prisoners frequently go without appropriate 
care and treatment.36 
The prison landscape did not always look as it does now. At the start of the 
twentieth century, mental-health care was based almost exclusively on state-
institutional care.37 By the late 1950s, it is estimated that over half a million 
Americans with mental illnesses lived in state-run psychiatric hospitals.38 
Beginning at that time and continuing up until the turn of the century, psychiatric 
hospitals across the country were shut down one-by-one as a part of the process of 
“desinstitutionalization.”39 This process freed hundreds of thousands of people with 
mental illness who had spent years “receiving greatly ineffectual” and brutal 
 
30  See infra Part I.B 
31  See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (holding that the Constitution does not 
require prison medical providers to provide inmates with unqualified access to healthcare); 
Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 750 (6th Cir. 2018) (“An inmate is entitled to adequate medical 
care, not the best care possible.”). Courts give substantial deference to the judgment of medical 
experts. See Rhinehart, 894 F.3d at 738 (quoting Richmond v. Huq, 885 F.3d 928, 940 (6th Cir. 
2018)). Even though Mr. Rudd suffered as a result of prison staff’s lackluster treatment, because 
some form of treatment was provided, the prison would likely be shielded from liability. For the 
level of care provided to violate Estelle, a plaintiff would have to show that the care was “so 
grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to 
fundamental fairness.” Terrance v. Northville Reg. Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 844 (6th Cir. 
2002) (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
32  See id. 
33  DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS 
OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 3 tbl. 1 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. 
34  SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESS 18 (2003), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf; see also Edward P. 
Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Mentally Ill Individuals in Jails and Prisons, 46 CRIME & JUST. 
231, 232 (2017) (noting that the rate of prisoners with serious mental health disorders in prisons 
has risen from 17% in 2004 to 28% in 2011). 
35  Roth, supra note 1. 
36  Jonathan D. LeCompte, When Cruel Become the Usual: The Mistreatment of Mentally Ill Inmates 
in South Carolina Prisons, 66 S.C. L. REV. 751, 759 (2015). 
37  Christina Canales, Prisons: The New Mental Health System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1725, 1731 (2012). 
38  See id. 
39  Abramsky & Fellner, supra note 34, at 5. 
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treatment.40 Initially, the plan was to move from institutionalization to community-
based treatment, but this plan never came to fruition.41 Patients with mental illness 
were ejected from state mental hospitals faster than the development of community 
mental health programs,42 which left many discharged patients abandoned on the 
streets without access to any treatment for their condition.43 While on the streets, 
these former patients were often unable to take care of even their basic needs.44 
Lacking the resources necessary for survival or any better alternatives, many of 
them turned to petty crime, which landed them in jail or prison.45 Thus, individuals 
with mental illness were swept in by the criminal justice system—mostly for non-
violent crimes.46 Other factors helped fuel this process, such as the criminalization 
of drugs in the 1980s and police tactics such as “social sanitation.”47 By the start of 
the twenty-first century, the population in psychiatric hospitals declined from over 
500,000 in the 1950s to only 55,000 in the year 2000.48 Meanwhile, in the year 2000, 
the population of prisoners with serious mental illness had burgeoned to almost 
300,000—a figure representing about 20% of the total prison population. 49 
Considering the Supreme Court recognized prisoners’ constitutional right to 
healthcare in Estelle v. Gamble,50 the fact that statistics show an extensive amount 
of inmates with mental illness are left untreated or undertreated51 is unacceptable.  
As the next Part of the Note will show, however, this is because the constitutional 
doctrine established by Estelle all but guarantees that prisons and jails will be 
shielded from liability. 
 
40  Id. at 20. 
41  Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of 
Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53, 53 (2011) (describing the sharp decline 
of state mental hospital populations coinciding with the sharp rise of inmates with mental 
illness.). 
42  Canales, supra note 37, at 1733. 
43  Abramsky & Fellner, supra note 34, at 16. 
44  Id. 
45  Canales, supra note 37, at 1737. 
46  Harcourt, supra note 41, at 53. 
47  See GEORGE F. COLE, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & CHRISTINA DEJONG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA 263 (8th ed. 2015). “Social sanitation” is where police arrest socially undesirable 
members of society—such as the homeless or mentally ill—to remove them from the streets. See 
John Kleinig, Policing the Homeless: An Ethical Dilemma, 2 J. SOC. DISTRESS & HOMELESS 289, 
296 (1993). 
48  COLE ET AL., supra note 47, at 173.  
49  See E. FULLER TORREY, AARON D. KENNARD, DON ESLINGER, RICHARD LAMB, JAMES PAVLE, MORE 
MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAILS AND PRISONS THAN HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 
(2010), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/final_jails_v_hospitals_ 
study.pdf (noting American Psychiatric Association estimated about 20% of prisoners are 
seriously mentally ill); ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, PRISONERS IN 2000, BUREAU JUST. 
STAT. (2001), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p00.pdf (noting the total number of prisoners 
under federal or state jurisdiction was 1,381,892 at year end). From this data, I estimate that the 
population of mentally ill prisoners was near 300,000 during the year 2000. 
50  See 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
51  See infra notes 46–47. 
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II. THE ROADBLOCK TO RECOVERY: ESTELLE V. GAMBLE  
In the 1976 landmark case Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held that 
denying a prisoner medical care constitutes a violation of the Eight Amendment.52 
The Court reasoned that the government had an obligation to care for prisoners, 
who by reason of their confinement cannot care for themselves.53 Additionally, the 
Court reasoned that a denial of medical care would undoubtedly lead to 
unnecessary suffering, that such suffering would be “inconsistent with 
contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation,” and that 
denying medical care is not related to any penological purpose.54  
Following Estelle, a body of caselaw clarifying the Court’s holding emerged as 
cases progressed through federal courts.55 Estelle had proclaimed that the 
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” would violate the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.56 Analyzing this 
language, lower courts developed a two-prong test to apply to medical-care claims.57 
Under this two-prong test, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when: 
(1) the prisoner’s medical condition is sufficiently serious and (2) where the prison 
official acted with deliberate indifference in response to the medical condition.58  
This two-prong test shields correctional facilities from liability for merely 
negligent conduct. Given the low risk of liability, correctional facilities are not 
pressured to provide better medical care.59 Indeed, a 2012 study revealed that only 
about half of the prisoners who met the threshold for a serious mental illness had 
actually received treatment at some point since being admitted,60 and only about a 
third of prisoners meeting the threshold for a serious mental illness were still 
receiving ongoing treatment at the time of the interview.61 Although the report does 
not specify whether those inmates who formerly received treatment were still in 
need of it, the report makes clear that a substantial number of inmates with mental 
illness are going without treatment for their ailments.62  
 
52  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
53  Id. at 103. 
54  Id. 
55  See generally Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 
CORNELL L. REV. 357, 362–85 (2018) (providing a comprehensive overview of Supreme Court 
caselaw that precipitated from Estelle v. Gamble).  
56  429 U.S. at 104 (internal quotations omitted). 
57  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
58  Id. 
59  The small fraction of prisoners who actually succeed in winning lawsuits illustrates how unlikely 
it is for a correctional facility to be held liable. See infra notes 171–73. 
60  Jennifer Bronson & Marcus Berzofsky, Indicators of Mental Health Problems Reported by 
Prisoners and Jail Inmates, 2011-12, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 8 (June 2017), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/imhprpji1112.pdf.  
61  Id. 
62  See id. Human Rights Watch states that according to the National Commission on Correctional 
Health Care (NCCHC), “only 231 of the nation's approximately 1,400 prisons have received 
NCCHC accreditation, meaning that they adhere to NCCHC guidelines [such as effectively 
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In sum, to progress through the roadblock that is the Estelle test, prisoners 
must not only prove that they suffered from a qualifying illness, they must also 
prove prison officials were subjectively aware of the illness and its attendant risks.63 
Thus, even if objective facts indicate an inmate’s illness presents an immediate risk 
of serious harm, prison officials would be insulated from liability unless prison 
officials actually knew of the immediate risk and intentionally failed to act as a 
method of punishment.64 The following two subparts of this Note will analyze both 
prongs of Estelle as applied to mental-health treatment. 
A. Prong 1: “A Serious Medical Need” 
The first prong of the Estelle test requires a prisoner to prove he or she 
suffers from a serious medical condition, which may be more burdensome to a 
prisoner with a mental rather than a physical illness. In Estelle, the Court provided 
no guidance as to what constitutes a serious medical condition.65 This lack of 
instruction left it up to lower courts to define the contours of a “serious medical 
need.” Given the little guidance from Estelle, courts were initially uncertain if 
mental illness should even qualify as a “serious medical need”—as the prisoner-
plaintiff in Estelle had a physical illness.66 The Fourth Circuit was the first court to 
address this question in the case Bowring v. Godwin.67 Other courts have since 
followed suit, agreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s proposition that no logical 
distinction (at least in terms of right to treatment) between physical and mental 
health exists.68 Along with applying Estelle equally to mental health, the Fourth 
Circuit also provided a helpful test to determine when a mental illness is objectively 
serious.69 The Fourth Circuit concluded that a mental illness is objectively serious if 
a physician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary skill at the time of 
observation, determines with “reasonable medical certainty that (1) the prisoner’s 
symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that such disease is curable or 
may be substantially alleviated through treatment; and (3) that the potential for 
harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or denial of care would be substantial.”70  
Following the language in Bowring, courts generally determine whether a 
“serious medical need” exists in one of two ways: (1) whether there is evidence of a 
 
screening inmates for mental illness upon admission] and submit themselves to monitoring by 
the organization.” Abramsky & Fellner, supra note 34, at 94. 
63  See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Kingsley Breathes New Life into Substantive Due Process as a 
Check on Abuses of Government Power, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 357, 381 (2017). 
64  See id. at 382–83. 
65  Id. at 382.  
66  See Kim P. Turner, Note, Raising the Bars: A Comparative Look at Treatment Standards for 
Mentally Ill Prisoners in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L 
COMP. L. 409, 420 (2008). 
67  551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977). 
68  Lori A. Marschke, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for Mentally Ill Inmates, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 487, 504 (2004). 
69  See id. at 503–04. 
70  Godwin, 551 F.2d at 47. 
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prior diagnosis and treatment; or (2) whether the need for treatment was so 
objectively obvious that even a layperson lacking specialized knowledge would have 
recognized the need for treatment.71 If prisoners with mental illness cannot provide 
medical evidence of a prior diagnosis, then proving they have a serious medical 
illness may be challenging for them. This is because the symptoms of mental illness 
are less likely to be obvious to a layperson than would be the symptoms of a 
physical illness. For instance, a broken bone protruding through the skin would be 
sufficiently obvious to a layman, but the signs of mental illness are often mistaken 
or missed.72 Accordingly, without a formal diagnosis, an inmate must wait until her 
mental illness manifests itself in the form of bizarre or self-destructive behavior to 
establish a “serious medical need”.73  
Even if a prisoner can provide medical evidence of having a serious mental 
illness, courts limit what constitutes adequate treatment to that which would be 
feasible based on cost and time.74 Notably, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “the 
essential test is one of medical necessity and not simply that which may be 
considered merely desirable.”75 Given the paucity of resources for mental health 
treatment in prisons,76 it would follow that the bar to establish a medical necessity 
is exceedingly high.  
B. Prong 2: Deliberate Indifference 
The second prong of the Estelle test—“deliberate indifference”—is the intent 
element to establish liability for failure to provide adequate healthcare.77 Prior to 
Estelle, it appears the Supreme Court had never before used the phrase “deliberate 
indifference.”78 Hence, at the time of the Estelle decision, there was no precedent to 
indicate the phrase’s meaning, and the Estelle Court did not offer much in terms of 
defining the phrase.79 The Court vaguely held that deliberate indifference is more 
than ordinary negligence and that only indifference that offends developing 
standards of decency would violate the Eighth Amendment.80 Because of the 
 
71  Marschke, supra note 68, at 508. 
72  Fred Cohen, Captives’ Legal Right to Mental Health Care, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 19 (1993).  
73  See Abramsky & Fellner, supra note 34, at 82. Bizarre and self-destructive behavior evincing the 
existence of serve mental illness must be extraordinarily unusual to be considered sufficient to 
put a layperson on notice. For example, an inmate's cries for help, self-harm such as cutting 
oneself, masturbating publicly, or smearing feces on the wall. Id. Courts have determined that 
“mere depression,” behavioral problems, or emotional problems without more do not qualify as 
serious mental illness. Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates with Mental Disorders: A Guide to 
Law and Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 341 (1992). 
74  See Bowring, 551 F.2d at 47–48. 
75  Id. at 48. 
76  See Roth, supra note 1.  
77  Cohen, supra note 72, at 22. 
78  See id. (noting that a search of all Supreme Court decisions back to 1790 reveals no prior 
reference to “deliberate indifference” or any variation of the phrase). 
79  Marschke, supra note 68, at 512. 
80  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). 
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phrase’s vagueness, a temporary circuit split over the meaning of “deliberate 
indifference” arose following Estelle.81 
The circuit split centered on whether the deliberate indifference standard 
required objective or subjective culpability.82 Some of the circuits equated deliberate 
indifference with civil recklessness, while other circuits equated it with criminal 
recklessness.83 Circuits adopting the civil recklessness definition held that 
deliberate indifference is when one disregards a substantial risk of danger that is 
either known or would be known to a reasonable person in his or her position.84 
Circuits adopting the criminal recklessness definition held that deliberate 
indifference means one must have actual knowledge of a substantial risk; it is not 
enough that the risk would have been known to a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position.85  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Farmer v. Brennan to resolve this 
split and to provide a conclusive definition of deliberate indifference.86 The Court 
first determined that “deliberate indifference” is indeed synonymous with some 
form of recklessness.87 However, the Court grappled with whether to apply the civil-
law standard or the criminal-law standard of recklessness.88 Ultimately, the Court 
settled on the criminal-law standard of recklessness—adopting the Model Penal 
Code definition verbatim.89 In effect, the Court concluded that to establish 
deliberate indifference, an inmate must prove that prison officials acted 
subjectively, or in other words, actually knew of the inmate’s serious mental-health 
need while consciously choosing to ignore it.90 The Court stated: 
We reject petitioner’s invitation to adopt an objective test for 
deliberate indifference. We hold instead that a prison official cannot 
be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate 
humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and 
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official 
must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that 




81  Marschke, supra note 68, at 512. 
82  Id. at 512. 
83  Id. at 512–13. The civil definition of recklessness is drawn from the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 500. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. The criminal definition is drawn from the Model Penal 
Code § 2.02(2)(c). Id. at 836–37. 
84  See, e.g., Wilks v. Young, 897 F.2d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1990). 
85  See, e.g., LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993). 
86  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829.  
87  Id. at 836. 
88  Id. at 836–37. 
89  Id. at 839–40. 
90  See Marschske, supra note 53, at 515. 
91  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
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The Court noted that because the Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of 
cruel and unusual punishment and not cruel and usual conditions, subjective intent 
is an inherent element within the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.92 In 
rejecting an objective standard of culpability, the Court concluded that a prison 
official’s failure to address a significant risk he or she should have perceived cannot 
be considered the infliction of punishment unless the prison official actually knew of 
the risk.93 Thus, no matter how obvious an inmate’s mental illness may be, a prison 
official is not liable for an injury unless he or she actually knew that the inmate had 
a serious mental illness.  
Because the symptoms of mental illness are often nuanced and difficult for 
the layperson to detect, this prong presents an extremely high hurdle for prisoners 
with mental illness to clear.94 The prong’s exacting mens rea requirement provides 
substantial deference to prison administrators and allows them to almost always 
evade liability.95 Because the current standard focuses only on individual state of 
mind, a prisoner who shows she received medical care that was merely incompetent 
or negligent cannot recover no matter how badly she was harmed.96 This standard 
is exactly why John Rudd, the inmate discussed in Part I, would have been highly 
unlikely to succeed in a lawsuit against his correctional facility.97 
All in all, the courts are reluctant to find Eighth Amendment violations 
absent truly egregious violations.98 Fortunately, a recent decision by the Supreme 
Court signals that the Court may be open to reconsidering the merits of the current 
deliberate indifference standard. 
 
92  Id. at 837–38 (“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived 
but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the 
infliction of punishment.”). 
93  See id. at 839. 
94  See Cohen, supra note 72, at 19 (“When I recently observed inmates in a prison disciplinary unit 
climb the bars, disrobe, and display their genitals, and then let loose a string of inflammatory 
profanities, I could not be certain that this behavior represented mental illness or rebellion. 
Those experts accompanying me could be no more certain.”); Marschke, supra note 68, at 529. 
95  Shapiro & Hogle, supra note 14, at 2039. Prior to Farmer, when the Court used an objective test, 
plaintiff’s prevailed in 32% of custodial suicide cases. Darrell L. Ross, Examining the Liability 
Trends of Custodial Suicides, CORRECTIONSONE NEWS (Nov. 18, 2010), 
https://www.correctionsone.com/law-and-legislation/articles/examining-the-liability-trends-of-
custodial-suicides-jIyhePiWJZCJK0qQ/. Following Farmer (1994-2007), plaintiff’s prevailed in 
only 17% of cases. Id. 
96  Shapiro & Hogle, supra note 14, at 2041. 
97  See supra text accompanying notes 24–31. 
98  See, e.g., Marschke, supra note 68, at 488–89. The author details the horrific abuse of Pamela 
Young, a young woman suffering from manic-depression who was sentenced to jail. When Young 
told a prison guard that she was hearing voices, the guard’s idea of “treatment” was placing her 
in an isolation cell. While in the cell, Young’s mental condition continued to deteriorate. In a 
state of psychosis, Young attempted to flood her cell with urine. The guards responded by 
stripping Young naked and shackling her to a bed. Because Young could not reach the toilet, she 
was forced to urinate and defecate where she was shackled. When Young brought claim against 
the city in district court, the court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment and 
dismissed Young’s case. 
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III. MOVING TOWARDS AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD: KINGSLEY V. HENDRICKSON   
Not all inmates housed in correctional facilities are convicted prisoners. 
Many inmates housed in jails are pretrial detainees who have not been convicted of 
anything but are awaiting trial.99 Nonetheless, a host of circuits apply the Estelle 
deliberate indifference standard with no regard to whether an inmate was a 
prisoner or pretrial detainee.100  
In 2015, the Supreme Court considered the propriety of applying the Estelle 
standard to pretrial detainees.101 In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the Court held that, in 
claim for excessive force, a pretrial detainee should not be treated equivalently to a 
convicted prisoner.102 Therefore, the Court held, a pre-trial detainee should not need 
to present evidence of prison officials’ subjective intent to punish to hold the prison 
liable under the Constitution; rather, the pre-trial detainee need only provide 
evidence that the prison officials’ use of force was “objectively unreasonable.”103  
The Court reasoned that a different standard should apply to pretrial 
detainee claims because their claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment.104 Their claims arise under the 
Due Process Clause because pretrial detainees have not been convicted of any crime 
and therefore cannot be constitutionally punished.105 Put otherwise, it would be 
inappropriate to subject pretrial detainees to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.106 And 
given the fact that the language of the Due Process Clause and Eighth Amendment 
differ, the Court interpreted the Due Process Clause as requiring a different 
standard of liability than the Eighth Amendment.107  
Because Kingsley involved an excessive-force claim, the circuit courts are 
divided on how broadly to interpret the case’s holding.108 Some courts construe 
 
99  See Schlanger, supra note 55, at 425 (noting that over a third of the 750,000 housed in American 
jails are convicted prisoners and that over 80,000 state prisoners are housed in jails). Post-
conviction prisoners may be confined in jail while they await sentencing or if they are convicted 
of a misdemeanor or a low-level felony. Id. Furthermore, jails often do no separate pretrial 
detainees from convicted prisoners, finding it safer to mix the populations. Id. 
100  Compare, e.g., Murray v. Johnson, 367 F. App’x 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding deliberate 
indifference requires a pretrial detainee to prove subjective intent), and Bozeman v. Orum, 422 
F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), with Aldani v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 865–66 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (applying objective reasonableness test to excessive force claim), and Young v. Wolfe, 
478 F. App’x 354, 356 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the lower court judge correctly gave an Eighth 
Amendment excessive force instruction for a pre-trial detainee that brought a Fourteenth 
Amendment claim). 
101  Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015). 
102  See id. at 2473. 
103  Id.  
104  See id. at 2475. 
105  See id. 
106  See id. 
107  Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015). 
108  Compare, e.g., Nam Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cty. Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 
(11th Cir. 2017) (holding Kingsley only applies to pretrial detainee excessive force claims), with 
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Kingsley narrowly, holding that Kingsley only applies to excessive-force claims—not 
medical-care claims.109 But the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits read 
Kingsley more broadly.110 Those circuits maintain that Kingsley applies to both 
excessive-force claims and to medical-care claims.111  
Take the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Miranda v. County of Lake.112 There 
the court held  that “medical-care claims brought by pretrial detainees under the 
Fourteenth Amendment are subject only to the objective unreasonableness inquiry 
identified in Kingsley.”113 Rather than reading Kinglsey as limited to its facts, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded that a different constitutional standard is warranted for 
all pretrial detainee claims.114 The Kinglsey Court had held that pre-trial detainee 
claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, 
unlike the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause contains no reference to 
punishment.115 And if all pretrial detainee claims arise from the same source— the 
Due Process Clause—then the same standard of liability should apply to all pretrial 
detainee claims regardless of whether the claim is for excessive force or inadequate 
medical care.116  
The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Kingsley is the more reasonable reading 
of the case.  Other than the fortuitous fact that Kingsley involved with an excessive-
force claim rather than a medical-care claim, Kinglsey offers no other basis for 
distinguishing between these two types of claims. In fact, Kingsley may even 
suggest that there is no basis for distinguishing between pretrial detainee claims 
and convicted prison claims. As explained above, Kingsley—at least in part—
reasoned that courts should not apply the traditional Estelle standard to pretrial 
detainee claims because pretrial detainee claims arise from the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause—not the Eighth Amendment. But why should 
prisoner medical-care claims arise out of the Eighth Amendment and not the Due 
Process Clause? 
 
Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350–52 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding Kingsley applies to 
both excessive force and medical-care claims). 
109  See, e.g., Sheriff, Seminole County, 871 F.3d at 1279 (holding that pretrial detainee’s medical-
care claim is evaluated under the same standard applied under the Eighth Amendment). 
110  See Richmond v. Huq, 885 F.3d 928, 938 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018); Miranda, 900 F.3d at 350–52; 
Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1123–25 (9th Cir. 2018); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 
17, 34–35 (2d Cir. 2017). 
111  Id. (emphasis added). See Richmond, 885 F.3d at 938 n.3; Miranda, 900 F.3d at 350–52; Gordon, 
888 F.3d at 1123–25; Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35–35. 
112  900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018). 
113  Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352. 
114  See id. 
115  See id.  
116  See id. 
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IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES IN PLACE OF THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT 
 Whether the objective standard adopted in Kingsley should also apply to 
convicted prisoners is a door that the Court explicitly left open.117 Many 
commentators have offered compelling arguments as to why the same objective 
standard should apply to prisoners based on varying interpretations of the Eighth 
Amendment.118 However, none have considered the propriety of analyzing prisoner 
claims within the Eighth Amendment framework in the first place. Granted, Estelle 
provides precedent for doing so, but forty-four years have passed since Estelle was 
decided, and both the prison and doctrinal landscape have changed drastically in 
the intervening years. With that in mind, it may be time to for the Supreme Court 
to take a second look at the merits of grounding prisoner claims in the Eighth 
Amendment. Grounding both prisoner and pretrial detainee claims in the liberty 
component of the Due Process Clause, and applying the Kingsley objective standard 
instead of the Estelle deliberate indifference standard, would be more consistent 
with constitutional doctrine and would yield normative benefits for correctional 
facilities, inmates, and society as a whole.  
A. The Eighth Amendment is an Inappropriate Source 
The Eighth Amendment has been applied in three contexts: (1) as a limit to 
“the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes”; (2) as a 
prohibition against “punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the 
crime”; and (3) as a substantive limitation on what can be designated a criminal act 
punishable by law.119 The Supreme Court classified the Estelle decision as falling in 
the first category—as a limit on the kind of punishment that can be imposed.120 But 
when the state sentences an individual to prison, the federal government 
incarcerates the individual with the expectation that adequate healthcare will be 
provided during the prison term.121 The denial of medical care is not an explicit 
condition of incarceration—any failure to provide medical care is hence incidental 
and unintended by the government .122 Prior to Estelle, the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause applied specifically to punishment formally meted out by the 
state (i.e. judges and legislatures) rather than punishment administered by 
individuals.123 Because the denial of medical care cannot be understood as a 
 
117  Id. at 2476 (“We acknowledge that our view that an objective standard is appropriate in the 
context of excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment may raise questions about the use of subjective standard in the context of excessive 
force claims brought by convicted prisoners. We are not confronted with such a claim, however, 
so we need not address that issue today.”). 
118  See Marschke, supra note 68; Schlanger, supra note 55; Cohen, supra note 72. 
119  Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977). 
120  See id. 
121  See Thompson & Eldridge, supra note 9. 
122  See id. “The state” refers to judges and legislatures who define crimes and punishment. 
123  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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punishment formally administered by the state, Estelle expanded the scope of the 
Clause to cover punishment not explicitly sanctioned by the legislature or judiciary.  
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court stretched the meaning of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause to encompass punishment inflicted by individual 
prison staff.124 As noted above, the type of punishment formally imposed by the 
state is incarceration, not incarceration without access to medical care. I do not 
make this distinction to argue that prisoners should not have a constitutional right 
to medical care. I suggest only that this constitutional right should be not be 
grounded in the Eighth Amendment. Grounding prisoner medical-care claims in the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause exceeds the Clause’s language and original 
purpose. 
i. Original Purpose of the Eighth Amendment 
The Supreme Court summarized the history and original purpose of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in Ingraham v. Wright.125 The Framers 
intended the Eighth Amendment to serve as a continuation of a similar clause 
within the 1689 English Bill of Rights.126 The clause was included in the 1689 
English Bill of Rights in response to brutal punishments English judges and the 
monarchy commonly inflicted.127 When framing the Constitution, the Framers had 
the same concern as their ancestors who had drafted the English Bill of Rights.128 
When commenting on the underlying purpose of the Clause, the Supreme Court has 
stated that “the principal concern of the . . . Framers appears to have been with the 
legislative definition of crimes and punishments.”129 The Framers’ concern reflects 
the idea that the Eighth Amendment was intended to restrict the government from 
imposing cruel and unusual types of punishment in retribution for criminal acts.130 
In brief, the Framers intended the Amendment to impose a negative obligation 
upon the government—not to impose any affirmative obligation to act.  
It was not until Estelle that the Supreme Court interpreted the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause as placing an affirmative obligation to act on the 
state—more specifically—the obligation to provide medical care.131 In Estelle, the 
 
124  See 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
125  See 430 U.S. 651, 659–61 (1977). 
126  Id. at 664. 
127  See id.  
128  See id. at 665 (“The Americans who adopted the language of . . . the English Bill of Rights . . . 
feared the imposition of torture and other cruel punishments . . . by judges . . . [and the] 
legislatures . . . .”). 
129  Id. (emphasis added). 
130  Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1990) (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th 
Cir. 1985)). 
131  Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198 (1989) (holding 
that the government assumes an affirmative duty to provide medical care under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause when it incarcerates citizens for crimes), with Hudson v. McMillian, 
503 U.S. 1, 18 (1992) (“Until recent years, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was not 
deemed to apply at all to deprivations that were not inflicted as part of the sentence for a 
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Supreme Court justified the departure from prior precedent by reasoning that the 
failure to provide medical care could produce the type of pain the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause was designed to prohibit.132 The Court explained that 
denying medical care could “produce physical torture or a lingering death” that 
would otherwise be inconsistent with any penological purpose.133 Yet the Court 
neglected to consider that the Eighth Amendment was originally not concerned with 
pain generally, but pain specifically proscribed by the legislature as a consequence 
for criminal conduct.134 And the pain from denial of adequate medical care is pain 
generally; it is not pain proscribed by the legislature as a consequence for criminal 
conduct.135 In short, Estelle’s applying the Eighth Amendment to denial-of-medical-
care claims marked a significant departure from the Amendment’s original purpose. 
ii. Textual Analysis 
Furthermore, the text of the Eighth Amendment does not support Estelle’s 
holding. The word “punishment” standing alone could certainly refer to the denial of 
medical care; however, the word must be defined in context, not in isolation.136 
Under the dictionary definition of “punishment,” a prison guard who retaliates 
against an obnoxious inmate by neglecting to deliver his pain medication could be 
said to be “punishing” the inmate.137 But given the external context in which the 
word “punishment” appears, it should not be defined so broadly.138  
First, in interpreting the meaning of the word “punishment,” as it is used in 
the Eighth Amendment, one must consider that the word appears in the Bill of 
Rights. The Bill of Rights exists to limit the power of the government, not the power 
of private actors.139 Second, turning to the Eighth Amendment itself, the whole text 
 
crime.”) (Thomas, J., dissenting). These cases provide a helpful illustration of how the Court in 
Estelle stretched the traditional understanding of the Eighth Amendment. As noted by Justice 
Thomas in Hudson v. McMillian, the Eighth Amendment was not read to impose affirmative 
obligations on the government prior to the Court’s decision in Estelle. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 18. 
132  See 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
133  Id. (citing In Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
134  See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667–68 (holding that Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does 
not apply to public schools because it is concerned solely with punishment for the violation of 
criminal statutes).  
135  See Thompson & Eldridge, supra note 9. 
136  See Merit Management Group v. FTI Counseling, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883, 893 (2018) (citing 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)) (noting that when construing a statute, 
courts look to both the language itself and the specific context in which it is used to determine 
plain meaning). 
137  For example, Webster’s New World Dictionary defines punishment as a noun meaning “harsh 
treatment.” Punishment, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (Pocket Books Paperback ed., 
1995). Given such broad meaning, the word “punishment” could refer to numerous things.  
138  See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
881, 898 (2009) (arguing that “punishment” should be read as prohibiting cruel and unusual 
punishment inflicted formally by the state as a penalty for crimes). 
139  Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 10 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The basic 
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to protect individual liberty against governmental procedures 
that the Framers thought[sic] should not be used.”). 
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clearly refers to activities solely within the purview of the state, not a private 
actor.140 Hence “punishment” should be understood as referring to punishment 
imposed by the government. Indeed, in most legal contexts, the word punishment is 
understood to refer to “a sanction—such as a fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of 
property, right, or privilege—assessed against a person who has violated the 
law.”141 
The Supreme Court seems to support this interpretation of the word 
punishment. In Farmer v. Brennan, a Majority of the Court noted that “[t]he Eighth 
Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and 
unusual ‘punishments.’”142 In concurrence with the Majority, Justice Thomas noted 
that “from the time of the founding through the present day, [punishment] has 
always meant a ‘fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the 
authority of the law and the judgment and sentence of a court, for some crime or 
offense committed by him.’”143  
In brief, the denial of medical care is separate from the type of punishment 
the state has chosen to inflict, and it is not something the state intends to inflict 
when incarcerating offenders.144 Thus, denial of medical care should not be 
considered punishment within the Eighth Amendment framework. 
iii. Returning to Original Meaning 
The Supreme Court’s struggle to interpret “punishment” in the prisoner 
medical-care claim context over decades illustrates the utility of an originalist 
interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.145 Some members of 
the Court have emphasized that the word “punishment” requires a showing of 
subjective intent on the part of the prison official.146 In Wilson v. Seiter, Justice 
Scalia held that the clause has a subjective component because the literal definition 
of the word “punishment” is “to chastise or deter.”147 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, 
 
140  See Bail, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining bail as a security required to be 
given to the court for the release of a criminal defendant who must appear in court at a future 
time); Excessive Fine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining excessive fine imposed 
by the government in consequence of a crime that is excessive in proportion to the crime). 
141  Punishment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
142  Id. 
143  Id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
144  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 n.13 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
145  See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (evaluating overcrowded prison 
conditions entirely objectively and devoting no words to intent); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
538 (1979) (holding that intent to punish or objective unreasonableness can establish liability); 
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685–87 (1978) (holding that objectively horrendous conditions 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment). But see Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) 
(holding that in prison condition cases, prisoners must demonstrate officials acted with 
subjective intent).  
146  E.g., Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 (“If the pain inflicted in not formally meted out as punishment by 
the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting 
officer before it can qualify.”).  
147  Id. 
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“[i]f the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the 
sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer 
before it can qualify.”148  
Other members of the Court, however, have opined that any standard of 
liability should be entirely objective because the Eighth Amendment concerns the 
nature of the punishment inflicted, not the mens rea of those inflicting it.149 In the 
1981 case Rhodes v. Chapman, Justice Powell evaluated the challenged prison 
conditions entirely objectively, devoting no words to subjective intent.150 Scholars 
have supported this objective approach, arguing that living in prison and enduring 
all its attendant conditions is the “punishment” for Eighth Amendment purposes.151  
At bottom, considering the plain language and original purpose of the Eighth 
Amendment, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause should not cover denial of 
medical-care claims. The original purpose of the Amendment was to impose a 
negative obligation on the state, limiting its discretion on what types of 
punishments it could use to punish criminals. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause should be read according to its original purpose and to the context in which 
it appears. This is not to say I do not think that prisons have an obligation to 
provide adequate medical care to prisoners; I do. That is the primary concern of this 
Note. My sole contention is that a prison’s obligation to provide adequate medical 
care need not be examined under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
B. Due Process Rights  
Since Estelle, the Supreme Court has recognized that, whenever the state 
undertakes certain custodial roles with respect to an individual, it creates a “special 
relationship” that—under a due process framework—places an affirmative 
obligation on the state to provide for that person’s safety and general well-being.152 
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the Court held 
that the government assumes an affirmative duty to protect a person whenever it 
deprives a person of their of her freedom to act on his or her own, regardless of the 
circumstances of confinement.153 Scholars have referred to this rule as the “law of 
captives’ rights.”154  
 
148  Id. 
149  E.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 567 (J., Marshall, dissenting). 
150  Schlanger, supra note 55, at 377. 
151  See Dolovich, supra note 138, at 907 (2009); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 
(1977) (“Prison brutality . . . is part of the total punishment to which the individual is being 
subjected for his crime and such, is a proper subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny.”) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
152  M. D. by Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 249 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 
200).  
153  489 U.S. at 200. 
154  Cohen, supra note 72, at 1 (“The term captive refers to a person in the physical custody of the 
government, before trial or after conviction and a sentence of incarceration, or after civil 
commitment . . . .”). When referring to someone who has been detained by the government 
(regardless of the purpose for her confinement) I will use the noun “captive.” 
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The Court has stated that “[t]he affirmative duty to protect [captives] arises 
not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its 
expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on 
his freedom to act on his own behalf.”155 Thus, regardless of why the government 
confines a captive, the Constitution imposes a duty upon the government to assume 
responsibility for that captive’s safety and well-being.156  
Applying this rule, the Supreme Court has identified a substantive due 
process right to medical care for pretrial detainees, immigrants, the involuntarily 
civilly committed, and children in federal custody.157 In instances where an 
involuntarily committed person or foster child is taken into the government’s 
custody, the affirmative duty to provide medical care arises from the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.158 It is only when the captive is a convicted 
prisoner that the right stems from the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.159 
 Because the language of the two clauses is not coextensive,160 the Supreme 
Court has articulated different standards of liability for prisoners and other 
similarly situated captives.161 Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 
the Court places far more emphasis on the government actor’s subjective state of 
mind,162 whereas under the Due Process Clauses, the Court generally looks only for 
objective unreasonableness.163 
For example, in Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court held that in claims brought 
by involuntarily committed persons, plaintiffs need only show that the state failed 
to exercise professional judgment in rendering care—not deliberate indifference.164 
The Court declined to apply the Estelle deliberate indifference standard, reasoning 
that “[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more 
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose 
conditions of confinement are designed to punish.”165 Likewise, in Kingsley v. 
Hendrickson, the Court held that pretrial detainee claims stem from the Fourteenth 
 
155  DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.  
156  Id. at 199–200. 
157  See, e.g., M. D. ex rel. Stukenberg, 907 F.3d at 249. 
158  See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1982) (holding that the involuntarily 
committed have a due process right to minimally adequate training); Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. 
N.M. Dept. of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893–94 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that foster children 
in state custody have rights under the due process clause akin to those afforded to the 
involuntarily committed in Youngberg). 
159  See Ingraham v. Wright 430 U.S. 651, 671–72 (1977) (holding that corporate punishment in 
public schools implicates constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due Process 
Clause, but that the Eighth Amendment is an inappropriate source of liability); Spivey v. Elliot, 
29 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that residential school owed its student an 
affirmative duty under the Due Process Clause to protect that student from harm).  
160  See supra Part II. 
161  See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015); Miranda v. County Lake, 900 F.3d 
335,352 (7th Cir. 2018). 
162  Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2475. 
163  See e.g., id. 
164  457 U.S. at 312. 
165  Id. at 321–22. 
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Amendment Due Process Clause, which mandates an “objective unreasonableness” 
standard because unlike convicted prisoners, pretrial detainees “cannot be punished 
at all.”166 
Why are prisoner claims brought under the Eighth Amendment instead of 
the liberty component of the Due Process Clause? The Court bases the bifurcation 
on the purpose of prisoners’ confinement, which is punishment for a crime.167 But as 
discussed above, the denial of medical care is not the formal punishment imposed by 
the state in retribution for a crime—thus it should not be considered a 
“punishment” warranting Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Furthermore, because 
convicted prisoners are similarly situated to other captives, the same standard 
should apply equally to all captives. For these reasons, the Court should ground 
prisoner claims in the Due Process Clause and apply the objective unreasonableness 
standard laid out in Kingsley.  
i. Similarly Situated Captives 
Because prisoners are equally reliant on the government for medical care as 
pretrial detainees and involuntarily committed persons, the Due Process Clauses 
and the objective standard should apply uniformly.  
In the Equal Protection context, when two groups are similarly situated, the 
Supreme Court has held that they should be treated alike.168 Generally, to qualify 
as similarly situated, groups need only share characteristics related to the claimed 
service.169 Prisoners, pretrial detainees, and the involuntarily committed share the 
characteristic of being in the custody of the state and being deprived of their 
personal autonomy.170 Because of these characteristics, no group of captives is any 
less dependent on the state to provide them medical care.171 In spite of this equal 
reliance on the state, the Court distinguishes prisoners from pretrial detainees and 
the involuntarily committed based on criminality. Distinguishing prisoners based 
on criminality, however, conflicts with other Supreme Court precedent.  
Consider Baxtron v. Herold for example.172 In Baxstrom v. Herold, the 
Supreme Court held that prisoners with mental illness are entitled to the same civil 
commitment procedures as everyone else, regardless of prisoner’s criminality.173 
 
166  135 S. Ct. at 2475. 
167  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). 
168  City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Though I am not suggesting applying a different standard to prisoners 
runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, this maxim is helpful to understanding the logic 
behind adopting the same standard for both prisoners and pretrial detainees. 
169  Rose Carmen Goldberg, The Antidotes to the Double Standard: Protecting the Healthcare Rights 
of Mentally Ill Inmates by Blurring the Line Between Estelle and Youngberg, 16 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 111, 126 (2016). 
170  See Cohen, supra note 72, at 1. 
171  See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982) (“Persons who have been involuntarily 
committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than 
criminals.”).  
172  See generally 383 U.S. 107 (1996) 
173  See Goldberg, supra note 169, at 127–28. 
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The Court held that applying a different standard to mentally-ill prisoners was 
“arbitrary” because criminality is not relevant to mental-health treatment.174 Given 
the Court’s holding in Baxstrom, it is difficult to understand why in other cases the 
Court has suggested that prisoners are less entitled to hold prison officials 
accountable because of their criminality.175 If the Supreme Court were to reconsider 
the Estelle standard with reference to Kinglsey, Baxstrom, Youngberg, and 
DeShaney, it would find a sound legal basis to hold that all claims—regardless of 
the claimant’s status as a prisoner, pretrial detainee, or involuntarily committed 
patient—should proceed under the Due Process Clause. 
ii. Policy Reasons Why Kingsley Objective Standard Should Apply to 
Prisoners 
Aside from the legal justifications for evaluating denial of medical care claims 
under the Due Process Clause and applying an objective standard to measure 
culpability, there are three compelling reasons to do so from a public policy 
perspective.  
First, applying a uniform standard could make it easier for prison and jail 
officials to comply with the Constitution. Under the current constitutional 
framework, prisoners and pretrial detainees are separated into distinct categories, 
with their claims treated under different constitutional doctrine.176 In reality, 
however, prisoners and pretrial detainees are not so distinct.177 In fact, prisoners 
and pretrial detainees are often mixed together within correctional facilities.178 Of 
the nearly 750,000 people housed in American jails, over a third are convicted 
prisoners; the rest are pretrial detainees.179 Prisoners may be confined in a jail with 
pretrial detainees while awaiting sentencing.180 In other cases, prisoners—if 
convicted of a misdemeanor or a low-grade felony—may serve their sentence out in 
jail alongside pretrial detainees.181 To make matters worse, many state jails have no 
mechanism in place to separate pretrial detainees from convicted prisoners.182 
Instead, these jails base housing assignments on individualized risk and 
supervision factors rather than on an inmate’s status as prisoner or pretrial 
detainee.183  
 
174  Id.; Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110 (1966) ("We hold that petitioner was denied equal 
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Because correctional facilities pay little attention to whether an inmate is a 
pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner and do not have a process to separate them, 
applying separate constitutional standards to these two groups is difficult in 
practice. Notably, commentators have revealed that jail and prison officials have a 
hard time creating and administering prison healthcare policy with a liability 
standard applying to some of the inmates they house, but not to others.184 If a 
uniform constitutional standard were to apply to both pretrial detainees and 
convicted prisoners, prison and jail officials would have a much easier time 
managing their facilities.  
To be sure, an objective standard would make it easier for plaintiff-inmates to 
hold prisons civilly liable. But, by making their constitutional duties more clear, a 
uniform standard applicable to both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners 
would allow prison officials to know what is necessary to avoid litigation in the first 
place. 
Second, increasing plaintiff success in litigation will presumably encourage 
more lawyers to take on inmate cases, which would afford vulnerable, prisoners 
with mental illness protection against potential abuses.  
Prisons in the United States are not independently monitored,185 therefore, 
prisoners must usually rely on litigation to enforce their constitutional rights. Even 
though prisoners must rely on litigation, statistics show that prisoner-plaintiffs not 
only lose more cases than regular plaintiffs—they lose faster.186 In 2012, out of all 
prisoner civil-right cases, a pretrial decision was made in favor of defendant 85% of 
the time, while a pretrial decision was made in favor of the plaintiff only 0.5% of the 
time.187 When filing pro se, a plaintiffs odds at success are even worse: in 2012 
courts denied pro-se inmate civil-rights claims 95% of the time.188 And because few 
lawyers are willing to take on inmate cases,189 the overwhelming majority of inmate 
claims proceed pro se.190  
There are several reasons that few lawyers willing to take on inmates as 
clients.191 For starters, most lawyers are compensated for prison work through 
contingency fees,192 and recent legislative enactments have placed stringent caps on 
these fees.193 Also, lawyers have a difficult time communicating with a client who is 
 
184  Id. at 425–26. 
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REV. 153, 165 (2015). 
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193  Id. 
376 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [8:2 
 
behind bars, which makes it difficult to build a winning case.194 Lastly, the pro-
prison Estelle standard makes these cases particularly unattractive.  
The Supreme Court cannot alter legislative enactments or make it easier for 
lawyers to communicate with prisoners. But it can do something about the pro-
prison Estelle standard. If the Court applied an objective standard to both pretrial 
detainee and prisoner medical-care claims, attorneys could more easily hold prisons 
liable for failing to provide adequate medical care.195 If it were easier to establish 
liability, more lawyers may be compelled to take on prison-condition cases despite 
the difficulties in representing a client who is behind bars.196 With more lawyers in 
the prison-litigation arena and a less deferential constitutional standard, more 
plaintiffs could recover when denied healthcare. And increased litigation would put 
needed pressure on prisons to implement policies to ensure that every prisoner is 
receiving adequate healthcare.197 As courts have long held, the threat of damages 
“encourage[s] those in a policymaking position to institute internal rules and 
programs designed to minimize the likelihood of unintentional infringements of 
constitutional rights.”198 
The third public-policy reason for abandoning the Estelle standard is that 
ensuring prisoners with mental illness are receiving adequate healthcare would 
yield economic benefits. Statistics indicate that prisoners with mental illness are 
confined in prisons for longer lengths of time than those without mental illness.199 
They are often described as being caught in a “revolving door” cycle with the 
corrections system.200 The National Alliance on Mental Illness reported that up to 
40% of adults who have serious mental illness will come into contact with the 
United States criminal justice system at some point in their lives, and records 
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indicate that people with mental illness are arrested far more frequently than 
people without mental illness.201 More arrests and longer terms of confinement 
mean more taxpayer money spent to house these inmates.202 Putting pressure on 
prisons to provide adequate treatment could allow many prisoners with mental 
illness to be released into society while limiting the chances of recidivism.203 To the 
best of the author’s knowledge, the amount of money that could be saved in the 
long-run by increasing mental health care resources has not been demonstrated 
empirically, but the costs of failing to do so have. Various commentators have 
demonstrated the substantial cost the “revolving-door cycle” accumulates.204 If civil 
litigation pressured prisons to increase their mental-health care resources and free 
people with mental illness from the revolving-door cycle, a substantial amount of 
money and resources could be saved in the long-run. 
CONCLUSION 
 In his address to the American Bar Association, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
had this to say about prisoners in America: 
We have a greater responsibility. As a profession, and as a people, we 
should know what happens after the prisoner is taken away. To be 
sure, the prisoner has violated the social contract; to be sure he must 
be punished to vindicate the law, to acknowledge the suffering of the 
victim, and to deter future crimes; still, the prisoner is a person; still, 
he or she is part of the family of humankind.205 
Inmates with mental illness are one of society’s most vulnerable populations, but 
concern for their well-being is frequently brushed aside. Certainly, many would say 
that harsh prison conditions are a moral desert for committing a criminal act.206 As 
Justice Kennedy explains in his speech, it is easy to forget that inmates have been 
deprived of their liberty but not their humanity. In a similar vein, Nelson Mandela 
once said that “no one truly knows a nation until one has been inside its jails. A nation 
should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but its lowest ones . . . .”207 
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 Of course, I do not contend that the Supreme Court could unilaterally solve the 
mental health crisis in prisons with the drafting of one opinion. This issue is 
assuredly far too complex for the judicial system to solve on its own. To bring about 
full and lasting change, legislative action will undoubtedly be necessary. However, 
the Supreme Court can play a significant role in the solution by updating the 
constitutional doctrine to comport with the realities of the modern prison 
environment. Analyzing claims under the Due Process Clause and implementing a 
purely objective standard would better protect inmates with mental illness against 
abuses and would put needed pressure on correctional facilities and legislatures to 
take action to ensure all prisoners receive adequate treatment. 
 
 
 
